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Prelude 
In 1998, several members of Guinea-Bissau’s National Assembly introduced an amendment to 
the country’s constitution.  If passed, the amendment – which became known as ‘artigo quinto’ 
(Article Five) – would require the president of the republic, along with several top ministerial 
positions (such as prime minister and minister of justice) to have been born in the Republic of 
Guinea-Bissau, as well as to be of Guinean parentage.  After much public debate, the proposed 
amendment was passed in the Assembly, and needed only to be signed off by the interim 
president.1  This has not happened.  In February 2001, members of various political parties and 
NGOs met for three days to attempt to ‘reach a consensus on a new constitution for Guinea-
Bissau’ (IRIN-West Africa Update 908; 12 February 2001).  The two main disputes centered on 
the relationship between the government and the military and artigo quinto.  One ‘humanitarian’ 
source was quoted as follows:  ‘In a country where about half the population is said to have come 
from abroad, mainly Guinea, Senegal, Gambia and Cape Verde, such an article creates serious 
problems’ (IRIN-West Africa Update 908; 12 February 2001).  As of April 2002, no consensus 
regarding the new constitution has been reached.   
 
Also during 1998, Guinea-Bissau experienced a popular military uprising with the sole objective 
of removing 19-year long president João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira from office.  General 
Ansumane Mané, then head of Guinea-Bissau’s army, led the uprising.  Mané had risen in the 
ranks of Guinea-Bissau’s army since he joined it as a combatant in the 11-year long liberation 
war, which finally ended with independence in 1975.  He had also served for many years as 
President Vieira’s bodyguard.  During Mané’s 1998 campaign against Vieira, Senegalese troops 
who were brought in to fight for Vieira leafleted the Guinean countryside from low-flying 
helicopters with propaganda urging Guinean citizens not to support Ansumane Mané.  The 
argument in the leaflets (ironically scattered throughout regions with extremely low literacy 
rates) was the following:  Ansumane Mané was not born in Guinea-Bissau; he was born in the 
Gambia.  He is therefore not truly Guinean, despite his lifetime’s distinguished military service.  
Subsequent dramatic events focused even more attention on Mané: in November 2000, Mané 
supposedly attempted to re-gain control of the military by revoking several military promotions 
made by President Kumba Yala and proclaiming himself head of Guinea-Bissau’s military.  
After Mané’s failed military take-over attempt, he fled Bissau to seek refuge in the outskirts of 
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the capital.  At one point, news sources announced that Mané had been captured and that 
procedures were underway to repatriate him to the Gambia (IRIN-West Africa Update 855; 
11/24/00).  It soon turned out that Mané had not been caught, and a few days later he was killed 
in a shoot-out between government loyalists and his supporters (eerily foreshadowing subsequent 
events in Kinshasa).  The national television station broadcast images of Mané’s corpse sprawled 
on the back of a truck, presumably to send a clear message of government power and control 
over oppositional forces and to quell any further attempts to disrupt state authority.2   
 
Many Guineans3 and international observers have called for investigations into Mané’s death; 
others have called for closer vigilance of the increasing power (and increasing ethnic 
homogeneity – or ‘balantazação’ as one opinion writer coined it, referring to the fact that Yala 
has appointed members of his own ethnic group – the Balanta – to all top government positions) 
of the current government.4  Meanwhile, Yala’s government began illegally jailing various 
civilians, including six opposition leaders and the founder of Guinea-Bissau’s national human 
rights league, claiming that they had supported Mané’s attempted military take-over.  The 
instability in Bissau, and fears over the government’s persecution and intimidation tactics, have 
led to increasing exodus from the capital to the countryside and neighboring nations. 
 
Similar events recently reverberated in Cote d’Ivoire during the fragile process of preparing for 
democratic elections following the unexpected coup in what was, until a short time ago, 
considered one of West Africa’s most stable civil societies.  The eligibility of the main 
opposition candidate for president – Alassane Ouattara (also the former Prime Minister) – was 
called into question, based on concerns about his authentic Ivorianess given the fact that he 
might have been born outside Cote d’Ivoire.  Ouattara has admitted that he holds a passport from 
neighboring Burkina Faso, and his parents were born in Burkina.  Cote d’Ivoire’s constitution 
has a clause that insists candidates for president must be Ivorian from birth.  The controversy 
over Ouattara’s nationality helped propel a rising tide of xenophobia directed at an immigrant 
population that makes up about a third of Cote d’Ivoire’s population and the bulk of the 
agricultural workforce.  After much heated debate, Cote d’Ivoire’s supreme court barred 
Ouattara from running.  Elections in October 2000 resulted in the victory of socialist leader 
Laurent Gbagbo, although Ouattara’s supporters called for a new election.  Shortly after the 
 3 
elections, looting and killing broke out in the capital over the succession to power, which is now 
cast as an ethnic struggle.  Cote d’Ivoire’s supreme court continues to exclude Ouattara from 
political participation, barring him from running in parliamentary elections.  As of 2001, the 
death toll, increasingly involving random violence in the streets of Abidjan, continues to rise. 
 
   
Introduction 
This paper will delve into one dimension of these irony-laden examples of postcolonial politics: 
the intensified and expanded attention to birthplace as a determinative factor in national identity 
and legitimacy.  Focusing on Guinea-Bissau, I will explore the logic of ‘native birth’ in the 
postcolonial nation-state as a marker of authenticity, particularly in light of recent scholarship on 
modernity. 
 
The episodes above sparked my curiosity about natal locality because of some peculiar aspects of 
constitutional native birth stipulations in the West African context, and more widely.5  First, the 
long durée of West African history would seem to counter notions of territorial boundedness and 
birthplace as relevant in ‘local’ constructions of identity.  From early migrations across the 
continent, to the genesis of new polities on the internal frontier, to the trans-Saharan trade routes 
connecting North and West African peoples, through the establishment of precolonial states, to 
the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, urban migration, and nation-state formation, West African 
history can be characterized by movement across porous borders – both geographical and social.  
Even in the post-independence era, there has been much traffic of goods and people across 
national borders.  The recent attention to natal locality, then, seems to suggest a change in the 
notion of identity within the postcolonial state as bound to birthplace.  I will explore what kind of 
imaginative work is involved in recalculating the relation between national territory and identity. 
 
A second, and related, aspect of native birth stipulations is that they seem to apply only at the 
national level.  Birthplace does not get invoked at any more local level – one’s congressperson or 
mayor need not be born in the locale for which they are running for office (as evidenced by 
Hillary Rodham Clinton’s senatorial victory in New York).  Why, then, does the nation have a 
particular stake in birthplace?   
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Finally, the salience of birthplace seems, at first blush, to have a wholly anti-modern quality.  It 
flies in the face of a quintessential aspect of modern personhood: self-fashioning.  How can 
something as out of one’s own control as the place in which one is born have any weight on 
determining one’s trajectory, after the accident of birth?  Moreover, birthplace stipulations stitch 
together identity and territory.  Much has been made (by Appadurai and others) of 
deterritorialization as a hallmark of modernity.  How does a conviction that the modern world is 
defined by the decline of the nation-state and a deterritorialized order of things take into account 
the highly territorial, and exclusively national, basis for the significance of birthplace?  How can 
we reconcile the tenacity (and intensification) of preoccupations over birthplace with modernity? 
 
This paper is framed by concerns about native birth stipulations – their lack of fit with the facts 
of African history and local notions of identity, their exclusively national basis, and their 
seeming incongruity with modernity.  In attempting to grapple with these issues, I have found a 
series of plausible analyses but no single coherent answer.  In this essay I present various 
interventions, operating at different levels of analysis, each of which sheds light on a particular 
aspect of this issue, but none of which can account for the whole story. 
 
Political Dimensions 
One set of explanations for increasing concerns with natal locality comes from a rather 
straightforward, political science orientation.  First, such maneuvers can be seen as thinly veiled 
political machinations from individual power players.  In Guinea-Bissau, the introduction of 
artigo quinto was specifically targeted at a few key individuals who were poised to launch what 
would have been successful presidential campaigns or become top government ministers, and 
happened to be of mixed parentage.  Their opponents seized on this fact and, through artigo 
quinto and a general appeal to Guinean nationalism, attempted to destabilize their popularity.  
This strategy of character assassination in highly charged political campaigns is far from 
extraordinary or unfamiliar, and its motives do not require much explication.   
 
Second, intensified concerns with native birth and national boundedness might be the result of a 
perceived state of national vulnerability.  Such rhetoric and strictures are more likely to come to 
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the fore during moments of national crisis, political and social upheaval, and transitions in state 
leadership.  Contemporary Guinea-Bissau can be characterized by such instability due to recent 
repercussions from ‘modernizing’ trends, the continued fall-out from the 1998 civil war, the 
subsequent sweeping overhaul in the national government and dramatic realignments of political 
parties and coalitions.  These changes have lent to an air of instability, and opened up questions 
about what it means to be Guinean and whether Guinea-Bissau itself is a viable nation-state.  At 
such uncertain times, there tends to be a rigidification or redefinition of nationality, both in terms 
of territorial boundedness and criteria for membership.  This tendency can be recognized in other 
moments of African postcolonial history, such as the immediate post-independence penchant to 
eject ‘outsiders’ (Idi Amin’s expulsion of Indians from Uganda being most obvious and 
infamous example) and extreme measures to ‘authenticate’ the nation and its citizens (such as 
Mobutu’s authenticité campaign in Zaire).   
 
Finally, attention to native birth might represent the inevitable fall-out from renewed 
democratization efforts in various African nation-states.  Part of the process of democratization 
involves an inexorable jockeying around who is, and who is not, a member of the demos.  Such 
debates are bound up, of course, with issues of electoral politics – who is eligible to vote, who is 
eligible to represent or lead the nation.  In nation-states comprised of complex mixtures of 
population groups (like almost every nation in Africa), perhaps birth within the territorial bounds 
of the nation becomes a kind of lowest common denominator for belonging. 
 
In sum, then, intensified concerns with natal locality may be explained through a combination of 
1.) personalized power plays; 2.) an outcome of socio-political upheaval and transformation; and 
3.) an upshot of revitalized democratization efforts.  The exploration of this phenomenon could 
stop here and elaborate on the empirical basis of each factor outlined above.  But these 
interpretations seem insufficient, especially as they do not account for what makes such 
strategies viable from a popular perspective.  In other words, while political machinations, 
democratization, and national uncertainty help explain why birthplace as constitutive of identity 
is being mobilized at this historic junction, they do not account for the popular purchase and 
ideological value of this specific trope.  Following Anderson (1983), we know that national 
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sentiment requires more than just realpolitik and power politics.  We must explore, then, why 
savvy politicians have tapped this particular vein of popular sentiment.   
 
Postcolonial Power 
One possible explanation for the viability of such political maneuvers in West Africa can be 
found in Achille Mbembe’s (1992) masterful analysis of postcolonial power.  The central 
concern driving Mbembe’s analysis has to do with the complicity of the supposedly subordinated 
subjects with their dominators.  Mbembe asks: ‘Why does the population apparently collude with 
its government?’ (Mbembe 1992:37).  His answer, argued through Bakhtin’s notion of the 
obscene and grotesque, is that there is an ‘intimacy, an almost domestic familiarity, in the 
relationship between ruler and ruled which effectively disarms both and turns power-play into 
performance’ (Mbembe 1992:37).  Mbembe’s analysis leaves little room for revolution or any 
dramatic change in power relations – resistance is seen only as a day-to-day playfulness that 
primarily serves to reconstitute the power structures already in place.  The postcolony, in 
Mbembe’s view, is characterized by the ‘illicit cohabitation’ and the ‘mutual zombification’ of 
rulers and ruled: 
 
peculiar…to the postcolony is the way the relationship between rulers and ruled 
is forged by a means of a specific practice: simulacrum (le simulacre). … people 
whose identities have been partly confiscated have been able, precisely because 
there was this pretense, to glue back together the bits and pieces of their 
fragmented identities.  By taking over the signs and language of officialdom, 
people have been able to remythologize their own conceptual universe while in 
the process turning the commandement into a sort of zombie. … [This process] 
produces a situation of disempowerment (impouvoir) for both the ruled and the 
rulers (Mbembe 1992:10). 
 
Mbembe’s notion of the Gulliverian logic of the postcolony, a kind of disproportionate response 
on the part of the state to moments of resistance in which ‘the tiny becomes huge, and the 
familiar strange, accompanied by the emptiest of gestures…’ does resonate with on the ground 
experiences in Guinea-Bissau (Mbembe 1992:16).  President Kumba Yala’s display of might – 
through random detainments, shoot-outs, and nationally televised images of Ansumane Mané’s 
bullet-ridden body – is, by conventional standards, a rather extreme response to Mané’s 
attempted power play.  It also resonates with Michael Watts’s (1999) discussion of the 
disproportionate exercise of state power in Nigeria.  Examining why Sani Abacha’s regime in 
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Nigeria took great pains to exterminate two minority and fringe movements, Watts explains that 
what was particularly disturbing to the Nigerian state about these movements was their exposure 
of a ‘national public secret’ – the weakness of the Nigerian nation-state itself as an imagined 
community.  Watts shows how disproportionate violence is the postcolonial state’s response to 
such exposure of the very fiction (or at least fragility) of the nation itself. 
 
However, while Mbembe and Watts help shed light on the disproportionate display of state 
power in Guinea-Bissau, their analyses do not account for the peculiarities of native birth as a 
leitmotif in these episodes.  Such an explanation must consider how ideas about native birth 
operate at the level of an Aristotelian commonplace – that is, something with which one argues 
but about which one does not argue.  In Guinea-Bissau, debates about artigo quinto centered on 
questions of racism and exposed the personalized motivations behind the proposed amendment, 
but did not question the fundamental basis of natal locality as determinative of national 
authenticity.  Analyses of this phenomenon must thus consider how ‘native birth’ operates as a 
custom in E.P. Thompson’s sense: a thing that encodes important but unspoken assumptions 
about a cultural system (Thompson 1993).  Through this lens, I will address some of my initial 
preoccupations with national exclusivity, identity, and modernity.  
 
Nations and Nationalism 
Recalling the introductory observation that natal locality seems to only have salience at the 
national level, I will now examine some particular aspects of nations and nationalism that might 
help to illuminate this facet of native birth stipulations.     
 
Benedict Anderson’s watershed analysis of nationalism suggests an embeddedness of native 
birth within the very origins of nations and nationalism.  Anderson makes a case for the Creole 
origins of nationalism, based to some extent on the accident of birth in the Americas – what he 
calls ‘the shared fatality of trans-Atlantic birth.’  Speaking of the Creole, Anderson remarks: 
 
Even if he was born within one week of his father’s migration, the accident of 
birth in the Americas consigned him to subordination - even though in terms of 
language, religion, ancestry, or manners he was largely indistinguishable from 
the Spain-born Spaniard.  There was nothing to be done about it: he was 
irremediably a creole.  Yet how irrational his exclusion must have seemed!  
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Nonetheless, hidden inside the irrationality was this logic: born in the Americas, 
he could not be a true Spaniard; ergo, born in Spain, the peninsular could not be 
a true American (Anderson 1983:57-58). 
 
Thus, if we accept Anderson’s argument, we see from the very beginning of modern nationalism 
a linkage between birthplace and legitimacy.   
 
Furthermore, Hobsbawm and Ranger (and their followers) have elucidated the role of ‘invented 
traditions’ in establishing nationhood.  Simply put, nations need to establish a sense of the past in 
order to legitimate their presence in the present. 
 
We should not be misled by a curious, but understandable paradox: modern 
nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, 
namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely 
human communities so ‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-
assertion (Hobsbawm 1983:13-14).  
 
Michael Watts strengthens this argument in his explication of Nicos Poulantzas’s somewhat 
cryptic assertion: ‘“A national unity or modern unity becomes a historicity of a territory and a 
territorialization of a history”’ (Watts 1999:19).  Watts unpacks this statement by explaining that  
 
the authentication of a national project must … involve the construction of an 
ethno-historical project, the creation of a sense of ‘naturalness.’… Nation 
building is an institutional, political and cultural process that involves a 
particular style of imagining to construct a collective identity which sutures 
territory and history (Watts 1999:29-30).   
 
What could be more ‘natural’ than birth and more ‘territorial’ than the physical space within the 
confines of national borders?  Watts’ analysis is, in many ways, an application of Raymond 
Williams’ notion of selective tradition – ‘an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and 
a pre-shaped present, which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural 
definition and identification… It is a version of the past which is intended to connect with and 
ratify the present’ (Williams 1977:115-116).   
 
Collectively, Williams, Hobsbawm and Watts help shed light on a curious element embedded in 
Guinea-Bissau’s artigo quinto.  The only other presidential eligibility criterion in the current 
Guinean constitution is a minimum age requirement – like in the U.S., all candidates for 
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president must be at least 35 years old.  If artigo quinto becomes incorporated into the 
constitution, the combined eligibility criteria eliminate the possibility for anyone to run for 
president for the next several years, given that Guinea-Bissau itself (the nation in which a 
potential, 35+ candidate must be born) is only 25 years old.  While we might dismiss this as an 
ironic legislative oversight, perhaps the insights of the authors above provide a more apt (if less 
conscious) explanation: Guinea-Bissau’s historical amnesia regarding its own recent ‘birth’ is a 
necessary pathology given the nation’s need to believe in its own primordial existence.  As 
Hobsbawm reminds us, ‘all invented traditions, so far as possible, use history [and, I would 
emphasize, extended history] as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion’ 
(Hobsbawm 1983:12).   
 
In addition to its need for history, territory, and a primordial sense of self, the nation also 
requires a cohesive emblem or symbol that signifies the unity of its members.6  In Guinea-
Bissau, one of the most visible national symbols is the appearance on men’s heads of a snug-
fitting, multi-colored, wool cap, popularized by Amílcar Cabral, the architect of Guinea-Bissau’s 
independence movement.  Cabral was particularly adept at fostering a sense of Guinean identity, 
which involved a conscious effort to transcend ethnic loyalties.  Almost all ethnic groups in 
Guinea-Bissau traditionally have an ethnically distinguishable hat, worn by initiated men.  
Cabral’s hat combines elements of the various ‘ethnic’ hats, and its symbolism is not reducible to 
a single ethnic group.  Despite its gender-lopsided use, it has stood as a symbol of Guinean 
national unity over and above ethnic diversity.  But after the 1998 civil conflict, the efficacy of 
the hat in the service of national cohesion has become increasingly eroded.  Given the popular 
resentment of Nino Vieira, and by association, the PAIGC (the national liberation party, which 
has been the only party to rule Guinea-Bissau since independence), Cabral’s hat has become 
more a symbol of PAIGC corruption, and of partidarian fractiousness, than of Guinean unity.  In 
addition, newly elected president Kumba Yala, a self-ascribed proud member of the majority 
Balanta ethnic group, has taken to wearing the Balanta hat in official and public settings.  The 
Balanta hat is a red wool cap with a pom-pom; it is a highly visible marker of Balanta-ness.  
There is much barroom chatter about the appropriateness – and the implications – of this 
presidential display of ethnicity. 
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Now that the once omni-present Cabral hat has fallen out of favor, markers of Guinean-ness are 
up for grabs.  Thus, invoking birthplace might serve as a generic marker of authenticity and 
cohesion that does not have to be elaborated by any specific content.  Again, given the 
circumstances of flux and uncertainty within the nation, perhaps it is not so surprising that such 
primordia are invoked, and resonate, in attempts to find solid ground. 
 
To sum up, the nation’s need for territorially based history, a primordial sense of itself, and a 
symbolic sense of unity all help to further elucidate aspects of the ‘native birth’ phenomenon.  
Now that I have examined some of the workings of native birth stipulations at the level of the 
nation, I will explore its implications for notions of identity.   
 
Fluid and Fixed Identities 
An important complementary angle from which to approach ‘customary’ invocations of natal 
locality requires an analysis of identity formation, and in particular, changes in West African 
notions of identity.  I suggest below that part of the answer to why invocations of birthplace-as-
identity are viable lies in the legacy of a colonial re-shaping of the very idea of identity.    
 
Much recent scholarship on colonialism and postcolonialism employs the trope of a colonial 
freezing of formerly fluid identities. Elsewhere, I have explored these issues through a 
consideration of several hundred years of Portuguese-African interaction in the Senegambian 
region (see Davidson 2002).  Reviewing Peter Mark’s (1999) analyses, I explored the dynamics 
of Portuguese and African contact on the Upper Guinea Coast and their ensuing implications for 
identity formation.  Mark argues that processes of creolization and hybridity reflect tendencies 
toward assimilation, inclusivity, and fluidity across cultural lines not only of Luso-African 
groups but of a pre-colonial, ‘indigenous’ coastal African sense of ethnic identity: 
 
The boundaries were fluid rather than fixed indicators of the ‘otherness’ of 
opposed populations… In this respect, Luso-Africans represent a model of 
identity formation quite rare in the modern world…One is led, if not to deny that 
coastal Luso-Africans conceptualized ‘otherness’ in the construction of their 
own sense of being ‘Portuguese,’ at least to suggest that this sense of the ‘other’ 
played a relatively circumscribed role in creating their image of who they were.  
This model of identity formation - flexible, malleable, and based on cultural and 
socio-economic factors - was characteristic of societies along the Upper Guinea 
Coast and derived from a local identity paradigm (Mark 1999:182). 
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In addressing the changes in Luso-African identity in subsequent centuries, Mark points to the 
ultimate dominance of the seventeenth century European formulation of identity being largely 
based on skin color, and the re-classification of coastal Luso-Africans accordingly (Mark 
1999:184-187).  Similar arguments on the impact of colonialism abound in postcolonial 
literature.  The consensus, simply put, can be encapsulated in the following formula: 
 
 Precolonial notions of identity = fluid and contextually based 
 Colonial notions of identity = fixed and rigid 
 
Terrence Ranger’s (1983) chapter on ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,’ illustrates 
this point quite cogently.  In colonial Africa, Europeans  
 
sought to tidy up and make more comprehensible the infinitely complex 
situation which they held to be a result of the ‘untraditional’ chaos of the 
nineteenth century.  People were to be ‘returned’ to their tribal identities; 
ethnicity was to be ‘restored’ as the basis of association and organization.  The 
new rigidities, immobilizations and ethnic identifications, while serving very 
immediate European interests, could nevertheless be seen by the whites as fully 
‘traditional’ and hence as legitimated… The trouble with this approach was that 
it totally misunderstood the realities of pre-colonial Africa.  These societies had 
certainly valued custom and continuity but custom was loosely defined and 
infinitely flexible (Ranger 1983:247, 249-250). 
 
In a different continental context, Partha Chatterjee’s (1993) analysis of colonialism echoes the 
same general formula.  According to Chatterjee, non-modern identities in India (even caste 
identities) were fluid and contextually defined, and precolonial communities were characterized 
by their ‘fuzziness’ (Chatterjee 1993:222 and chapter 11).  Modern political discourse fixed these 
identities and introduced a rigidity previously unknown.  It is only when colonial administrators 
arrived and began to enumerate (bodies, castes, ethnic groups, communities) that the concept of 
particular communities (defined in opposition to each other) came into being. 
 
The accounts of colonial administrators making order out of seeming chaos, and using European 
classification schema to assign individuals to ethnic groups which might or might not have 
existed prior to their arrival, do not need to be restated here.  What is important, for our purposes, 
is to understand the impact of a colonial/European sense of identity on subsequent formulations 
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of national identity.  Chatterjee sees this as critical for understanding the legacy of colonial 
sociological discourse in terms of how it still structures postcolonial politics.7 
 
Scholarship on colonialism thus leads us to conclude that the postcolony inherited from 
colonialism the modes for constructing identity and belonging.  This is most effectively 
expressed by Michael Watts: ‘It is as if difference must be constructed through an ineluctable 
logic of denial, refusal, exclusion: identity as zero-sum game’ (Watts 1999:12).  Put another way, 
European colonial notions of identity operated through the Aristotelian principle of non-
contradiction.  The rules of this game, when applied to the current situation in West Africa, 
become glaringly clear: If you are ‘from’ the Gambia, you cannot also be Guinean. And if you 
have one foot in Burkina Faso, you cannot place the other one (with any hope of standing 
upright) in Cote d’Ivoire.  Perhaps, in this light, the rigidity and rule-bound aspects of native 
birth constitutional stipulations, and the assertion of their legitimacy and value in the 
postcolonial African nation-state, represent yet one more piece of a colonial legacy of 
rigidification and inflexibility of identity. 
 
But there is something unsettling about this conclusion: it reinscribes the importance of 
colonialism without exposing the popular sentiment in postcolonial contexts that makes native 
birth important.  To assert that precolonial or ‘indigenous’ notions of identity were fluid and 
flexible and a colonial or European sense of identity was the contrary seems too easy.  The 
obvious question that ensues from such an exposition is, of course, why.  Why would 
‘indigenous’ models of identity and social groupings be based on principles of fluidity and 
inclusivity while European models be based on principles of opposition and exclusion?  What 
factors would lead to the emergence of such different schema for organizing human difference?  
And why did the European model ‘win’?  Following E.P. Thompson’s analysis of the making of 
a new human nature with the emergence of capitalism, we must ask, as he does: ‘How far was it 
imposed, how far assumed?’ (Thompson 1993:390).  It is not enough to identify the ‘external 
pressures which enforced this discipline;’ we must also explore how and why such changes were 
received, absorbed, resisted, and eventually internalized into a new subjectivity.8   
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This is, in many ways, a Foucauldian question that has been taken up in various forms in 
Subaltern Studies.  Chatterjee (1993) addresses such concerns through his objection to Anderson 
(1983) via the example of Indian nationalism.  According to Chatterjee, what needs to be 
considered, in light of the Indian case as well as most postcolonial cases, is the particular way the 
nation is imagined in an anti-colonial struggle.  Chatterjee’s objection to Anderson is with 
Anderson’s thesis of the modular adoption of national forms.  Chatterjee asks: 
 
If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community 
from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them by Europe and the 
Americas, what do they have left to imagine?  History, it would seem, has 
decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of 
modernity.  Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have 
thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and 
exploitation, but also that of our anticolonial resistance and postcolonial misery.  
Even our imaginations must remain forever colonized (Chatterjee 1993:5). 
 
Chatterjee counters Anderson’s notion of modularity not only on emotive grounds, but because it 
does not fit the empirical reality of postcolonial nationalisms.  ‘The most powerful as well as the 
most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an 
identity but rather on a difference with the ‘modular’ forms of the national society propagated by 
the modern West’ (Chatterjee 1993:5). 
 
The main problem of conventional analyses of nationalism, in Chatterjee’s view, is that they 
have concentrated almost exclusively on the political history of nationalism, and by ignoring its 
cultural dimensions, they have failed to gain a full understanding of nationalism, particularly in 
its postcolonial form.  Chatterjee argues that  
 
anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial 
society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power.  It does 
this by dividing the world of social practices into two domains -- the material 
and the spiritual.  The material is the domain of the ‘outside,’ of the economy 
and of state-craft, of science and technology, a domain where the West has 
proved its superiority and the East had succumbed.  In this domain, then, 
Western superiority has to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully 
studied and replicated.  The spiritual, on the other hand, is an ‘inner’ domain 
bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity.  The greater one’s success in 
imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to 
preserve the distinctness of one’s spiritual culture.  This formula is, I think, a 
fundamental feature of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa (Chatterjee 
1993:6). 
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This split becomes the foundation on which Chatterjee builds his theory of Indian nationalism; it 
is in the spiritual domain that the real imaginative work takes place.  A process akin to 
Williams’s (1977) selective tradition and Thompson’s (1993) formation of a new human nature 
(which takes on a more Foucauldian ‘subjectivity’ cast in Chatterjee’s rendition) yields the 
postcolonial imagined community.  It is the workings of this process, entirely missed in the 
purely political analyses of nationalism, that Chatterjee seeks to uncover in his study.   
 
Such an analysis owns up to (and does not apologize for) the fact that anticolonial nationalism in 
Asia and Africa needed to adopt certain Western traditions, but it also accounts for the ways in 
which the anticolonial struggle ‘fashion[ed] a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not 
Western’ (Chatterjee 1993:6).  It offers a nuanced example for how to go about answering some 
of the questions that linger after all-too-neat formulations of the colonized consciousness. 
 
Reconciling Native Birth with Modernity 
One of the enigmatic aspects of the salience of natal locality outlined in the beginning of this 
paper concerned its seemingly anti-modern quality, both in terms of its inherent anti-self 
fashioning bent and its move toward reterritorialization.  The intensification of ‘native birth’ 
stipulations and the often-grotesque displays of state power that ensue in such contestations are, 
without a doubt, reterritorializing moves on the part of the nation.  As Appadurai (1996) has 
suggested, global deterritorialization appears to beg a reactionary backlash of national 
reterritorialization; that is, grounded place becomes the nation’s revenge against 
deterritorialization.  But this interpretation casts such dynamics in a mutually exclusive 
antimony, stressing that the wave of history is toward de-localization, and hence reterritorializing 
can only be a kind of a temporary, if sometimes cruel, backlash.  The situation becomes more 
complicated, though, when we see, in practice, that reterritorialization and increased concerns 
with authenticity actually reinscribe dislocations by helping to propel major population 
disruption.  So the project of reterritorialization (especially when backed by State power) 
ironically intensifies the conditions of its own undermining.  Perhaps, then, it is time to consider 
the ways in which natal localization seemingly conflicts with the logic of modernity.  How can 
we reconcile the apparently ‘anti-modern’ move of artigo quinto with otherwise rapidly 
modernizing trends in Guinea-Bissau and an expressed wish to ‘be modern’? 
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Concerns over birthplace are, in many ways, the national version of a general resurgence – in 
Africa and many other parts of the world – of claims to autochthony.  In some instances, the very 
meaning of autochthony has been inverted.  In Burkina Faso, for example, les autochthones used 
to be pejorative, referring to uncivilized people of the land.  Now, les autochthones carry a 
positive valence, signifying the legitimate holders of knowledge and rights, the real Africans, the 
un-assimilated.  Such switches in signification are part of an ongoing process of imagining and 
instituting identity in the postcolonial framework.  Following Chatterjee’s framing of 
postcolonial nationalisms emerging through anticolonial well-springs, autochthony, authenticity, 
and Africaness are re-defined as tied to the land, and ‘belonging’ as intimately enmeshed with 
birth and blood. 
 
Such tendencies evoke Kopytoff’s (1987) frontier thesis of African ethnogenesis.9  Given the 
historic conditions of possibility for frontier-based social formation, Kopytoff argues that 
African societies are not primordial entities that grew from an ‘ethnic germ’ and maintained an 
ethnic essence over time.  Rather, African frontier polities are an amalgam of ‘ethnic and cultural 
detritus’ from surrounding societies, which repeatedly become incorporated into new social 
entities (Kopytoff 1987:7).  Throughout his discussion, Kopytoff stresses the importance of 
‘firstcomer’ status in the formation of emerging polities.  Simply put, according to the firstcomer 
principle, authority is legitimized by being first (first born in a family, first on the land, lineage 
founder, etc.).  The firstcomer principle establishes precedence as part of legitimacy and 
hierarchy.  Thus, ‘legitimation,’ as Kopytoff notes, ‘is couched in culturally valued idiom’ both 
through the first-comer principle and evoking ancestral ties (Kopytoff 1987:71).  Importantly, 
claims of first-comer status did not necessarily depend on factual chronological primacy on the 
land, but on successful civilizing of preceding savagery, on the introduction of social order, or on 
the redefinition (politically, socially, ritually) of previously occupied territory. Kopytoff’s 
analysis resonates with Williams’s (1977) notion of selective tradition as well as Hobsbawm and 
Ranger’s invented tradition as means of securing legitimacy and authority.  It also captures, in a 
postcolonial context, the nationalist mission of uplifting or civilizing the nation while validating, 
in a complementary fashion, its autochthony. 
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It is evident at this point that the incongruity of seemingly anti-modern invocations of birthplace 
in a place of hyper-conscious modernization can only be addressed by recasting the dynamic 
between the modern and traditional.  Rather than assuming an inimical relationship between the 
two, or an inexorable progression (with inevitable backlashes) from the traditional to the modern, 
the case of natal locality in the modern nation-state suggests a more recursive connection.  
Recent concerns with native birth in the modern nation-state highlight the intrinsic relationship 
between the ‘modern’ and ‘anti-modern.’  The constitution and nation-state, as ‘modern’ forms, 
update ‘traditional’ notions of descent-based legitimacy.  Yet they must also draw on notions of 
autochthony to do so.  It is the slippage between the ‘modern’ (democratization, constitutional 
reform, nationalism) and the ‘traditional’ (firstcomer status, autochthony, genealogically- and 
territorially-based legitimacy) that make native birth stipulations viable, especially in terms of 
deep-seated popular sentiment. 
 
Conclusions 
I initially became curious about notions of birthplace during my first visit to Guinea-Bissau, in 
July 1999.  I arrived in Bissau just a few weeks after the last day of the civil war, and was 
immediately swept up in the heady mixture of optimism, devastation, confusion, and boredom 
that I came to recognize as a peculiarly post-conflict ethos.  Many rainy-day conversations 
during that extreme rainy season were filled with the thrill of victory over corruption.  As people 
re-built their bullet-ridden homes, the radio played and re-played a catchy epic song recounting 
Ansumane Mané’s heroic overthrow of Vieira’s tainted government.  Enterprising adolescents 
sold montage photographs of the junta militar cut and pasted into the geographic shape of 
Guinea-Bissau or military heroes posing with bazookas on their shoulders, and truck drivers 
tacked these images onto their dashboards and cracked windshields.  Collective attention was 
riveted on this single past event – the ousting of their autocratic president – and when I would 
ask the pesky question ‘What comes next?’ I was most often met with blank stares and 
dismissive shrugs.   
 
It was in this milieu that artigo quinto (the proposed constitutional amendment stipulating native 
birth and parentage requirements for national political leaders) made its appearance, was debated 
on the streets and in the newspapers, was passed by members of the National Assembly, and was 
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eventually evasively shoved in a drawer, unsigned, by the interim president.  The amendment 
immediately captured my attention, both in and of itself (as a rather odd piece of legislation) and 
as a site of public contestation over issues like identity, race, nationality, and leadership.  When I 
discussed it with acquaintances in Bissau, most intellectuals dismissed it as a relic from the 
previous government, a last and futile attempt by desperate legislators to undermine progressive 
and competent leadership.  They were sure it would disappear once a new president was elected 
and things returned to normalcy. 
 
Just one year later, under the newly elected government of Kumba Yala, not only did artigo 
quinto resurface in discussions on constitutional reform, but rhetoric on Guinean birth and 
legitimacy was brought up in reference to the previously infallible hero Ansumane Mané.  The 
suggestion that he should be repatriated to his ‘native’ Gambia seemed ludicrous given his 
stature and service record in Guinea-Bissau.10  Mané’s death in the shoot-out between his 
loyalists and Yala’s troops precluded the possibility of bringing this repatriation attempt to 
fruition, so it is fruitless to guess what the outcome would have been had he lived.  What these 
events do suggest, however, is that concerns with native birth, national identity, and 
insider/outsider boundaries did not dissipate with the democratic election of Kumba Yala’s 
government.  Such preoccupations (spurred on by news from Cote D’Ivoire) are more alive than 
ever. 
 
Perhaps, given the various explanations offered in this paper, it seems less surprising that the 
ideological trope of birthplace-as-identity should be evoked at such moments of transition.  But, 
in addition to the dramatic changes currently underway in Guinea-Bissau, attention to birthplace 
as constitutive of belonging reflects another wider cultural transformation emergent in Africa 
since the late colonial era.  African polities have always been concerned to specify who belonged 
and who was an outsider, usually in genealogical or co-residential terms.  But there has been a 
long tradition of incorporating outsiders into African societies through marriage, absorption, 
appropriation, and assimilation.  Whatever the means, membership in a particular society 
generally emphasized cultural dimensions – through fictive kinship and the adoption of 
language, mode of dress, type of livelihood, and religious practices – over political and legal 
status.  Relatively recent macro-level political and economic transformations – such as 
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colonialism, independence, and democratization – have no doubt had a profound impact on 
micro-level beliefs and practices involving insiders and outsiders.  Intensified concerns about 
native birth within the nation-state can be viewed as part of an ongoing change in the status of 
strangers within African societies.  As Shack suggests: 
 
In the contemporary era of self-government, newly independent African nation-
states have increasingly treated jus in personam and jus in rem as rights to be 
defined and enforced by the state within its legal and political boundaries.  But 
exercising this privilege of sovereignty has reversed, as it were, the ‘normal’ 
process of change in the status of strangers (Shack and Skinner 1979:5). 
 
Thus, attention to birthplace simultaneously encodes deep-seated sentiments about firstcomers 
and territory, and transforms longstanding traditions of incorporation.  It is this embodiment of 
multiple intrinsically-bound contradictions – modern and anti-modern, rooted in and uprooting 
‘indigenous’ notions of identity and belonging, cohering and excluding, irrationally affective and 
rationally effective – that makes native birth stipulations such a rich site of enquiry and 
continued enigma. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Debates about artigo quinto, both in the national newspapers and in informal settings, focused on the ‘racist’ 
aspects of the proposed amendment.  Opponents emphasized the dangers of racialized politics and insisted that 
criteria for leadership should be based on capacity and public service records, not blood (see Diário de Bissau; 10-
29 July 1999). 
2 The events surrounding Mané’s death have never been confirmed, and Yala has refused any independent 
investigations into the case.  Some people in Bissau political circles suspect that Yala provoked Mané’s actions by 
making unreasonable military promotions, calculating that Mané would respond as he did, and thus providing a 
pretext for eliminating him (Interviews, Bissau; October-December 2001).  Since November 2001, Yala has 
thwarted three other supposed “coup attempts,” jailing many opposition leaders and closing down independent 
newspapers in the process.  Increasingly, people in Bissau suspect Yala of fabricating these coup attempts in order to 
undermine members of opposition parties and other critics. 
3 I use the term ‘Guinean’ to refer to the people of Guinea-Bissau.  This should not be confused with Guineans from 
the neighboring Republic of Guinea (also known locally as Guinea-Conakry). 
4 See Eduardo Costa Dias, ‘A Balantização da Guiné-Bissau,’ Jornal Público (5 December 2000); Lisbon, Portugal.  
The Balanta are the majority ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau, comprising 30 percent of the population.  There are 
approximately 32 ethnic groups (depending on who is counting) in this country of 1.2 million inhabitants.  The main 
ethnic groups, other than the Balanta, include the Fula, Mandinga, Manjaco, Mancanha, Papel, Bijagós, and Felupe. 
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5 Of course, constitutional stipulations on ‘native birth’ of the president are not exclusive to West Africa.  The U.S. 
constitution, as well as many others around the globe, requires that the president be native born. 
6 Quoting the literary theorist Lauren Berlant, Watts points out that the nation ‘“requires a National Symbolic … 
through which the historical nation aspires to achieve the inevitability of the status of natural law, a birthright”’ 
(Watts 1999:19). 
7 As Chatterjee states: ‘…even if we dismiss the sociological view that declares India to be a mere collection of 
discrete communities as a peculiarly colonial construct, we are apparently still left with a brand of postcolonial 
politics whose discursive forms are by no means free of that construct’ (Chatterjee 1993:224). 
8 Such investigations comprise an important next step in studies of ethnicity in the postcolonial world.  The 
revelation that many ethnic classifications emerged from colonial officials’ attempt to make order out of seeming 
chaos raises deeper questions of how and why these identities and ethnic categories took root, how they have 
become reified and naturalized, and how they are experienced today. 
9 In essence, Kopytoff’s proposal is a direct repudiation of both the tribal model for African social formation and 
evolutionary theories that posit a band-to-polity direction of development.  Kopytoff’s frontier thesis offers an 
alternative model of African ethnogenesis given historic patterns of movement and relatively shallow histories of 
most contemporary ‘ethnic groups,’ as well as accounts for the presence of widespread cultural and political 
phenomena (such as divine kingship).   
10 Mané’s fall from grace is a matter of complexity beyond the scope of this paper. Across the country, opinions 
regarding Mané’s loyalty to Guinea-Bissau, especially given his post-1999 comportment, vary widely (Interviews, 
Bissau and Interior; October 2001-June 2002). 
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